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Stunkel: Technology and Values in Traditional China and the West: II

TECHNOLOGY AND VALUES IN
TRADITIONAL CHINA AND THE WEST: II*

K E N N E T H R. S T U N K E L

Deciphering the Puzzle
In China the same values had far less dignity in the official
scheme of things, and the prevailing Confucian idea of human
nature had little to do with understanding, regulating, and
exploiting physical nature. Moreover, the Empire was organized
to preserve and extend balance and stability, not to stimulate
change, technological or otherwise. The organizing power for
centuries, rivaling the agricultural system and the written language as a key to China's continuity as a civilization, was the
bureaucracy, the mandarinate, for which there is nothing comparable elsewhere. This historically unique class of Confucian
managers and rulers was non-hereditary, non-titled, and nonspecialized, mostly chosen through examination, mainly functioning to supervise the labor of a vast agrarian society, perpetuating themselves through a monopoly on education, and sharing
the same worldview. They were the collective instrument of China's continuity as "a permanently bureaucratic society," and the
main institutional o b s t r u c t i o n to l o n g - t e r m , cumulative
technological innovation. 33 What we are looking for is a clue to
"the something in Chinese society which continually tended to
restore it to its original character, that of bureaucratic feudalism,
after all disturbances." 34
T h e non-economic, intellectual basis of their solidarity and role
in subordinating change—technological or otherwise—to tradition was an ancient conviction about human nature and the purpose of knowing, which came from Confucius and his later interpreters, provided justification for a hierarchical society, reached
definitive form in the Neo-Confucian synthesis of Chu Hsi
T e c h n o l o g y and Values in Traditional China and the West: I was
published in Comparative Civilizations Review 23 (Fall 1990):75—91.
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(1130-1200) in the Sung Dynasty, whose commentaries on the Five
Classics and especially the Four Books and dominated the examination system in the Ming-Ch'ing period. 35 T h e philosophical
anthropology of the Confucian literati reached directly or indirectly into every cranny of Chinese society. Government through
moral theory and edict was largely supreme.
The emphasis in Confucian moral philosophy was on proper
conduct and the discrimination of right from wrong. The teaching of Mencius (371-289 B.C.?), the most influential early Confucian, was that human nature (jen-hsing) is naturally good, with the
consequence that everyone starts from the same place and enjoys
a certain status of natural equality. 36 This assumption led to
others. First, that the purpose of knowing is recognition of the
proper from the improper so action may be rightly guided.
Knowing how to behave is what knowing is all about. Second, that
the instrument of knowing is the "evaluating mind that can assess
the natural nobility or baseness, Tightness or wrongness, propriety orimpropriety of an object, act, position, or event." 37 Third,
what determines the later inequality of men is the extent to which
the evaluating mind is employed. That is, natural equality at the
beginning is not incompatible with a subsequent hierarchy of
status based on observable behavior and tested moral knowledge.
Fourth, the evaluating mind can be cultivated by moral eduction,
which is the key to harmonizing both the self and the world.
Finally, the best evaluating minds, selected by competitive examination, should govern. Their role in society was to set a moral
example, to rule benevolently, and by so doing to maintain harmony between Heaven, Man and Earth. A bureaucracy ofchun tzu
(superior man, gentleman, the "sage" of later Confucian
thought), the finest evaluating minds in the land, make the world
funcdon less through causal action than through moral presence,
example, and judgment. 3 8 For the Confucian mind the purpose
of studying nature was not to understand rationally and objectively how things work, or to design better mousetraps, but to do
what is right. Achieving "rightness" in a universe that demands it
as a condition for order and balance was the moral objective of
public works and technology, not to master and control nature in
Baconian fashion. The proper objects of study and inquiry were
Confucian classics and moral examples of the past, not science
and engineering. Intellectual or technical novelty had distinctly
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/6
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subversive overtones. No wonder "the social and cultural milieu
in Ming-Ch'ing China was . . . hardly conducive to scientifice and
technological inventions." 39
T h e r e is no contradiction between this philosophical anthropology, with its highly specific claim of human natural equality, and the influential dictum of Mencius that "some labor with
their minds and some labor with their strength," which means
that some govern others and are supported by them. 40 Practice in
life reveals the activity of the evaluating mind and the degree of its
self-cultivation and cumulative wisdom. Education can increase it
and examination can identify it. The hierarchical class system—
literati, peasants, artisans, merchants—was a result of the inequality which results from men realizing or failing to realize their
naturally equal potential to discriminate and act on what is right.
A two-class society was not the outcome of distinguishing brains
from brawn. A social ideology based on the primacy of developing and recruiting into government service a body of evaluating
minds helps to explain traditional China's reluctance to mobilize
technology in the service of modernization in the nineteenth century.
A physical crisis for the Chinese state was not an invitation to
seek greater sufficiency and control over people or nature
through improved technology, but rather an inducement to
moral self-examination and reform shaped by judgments about
what is morally right. Drought, famine, flood, rebellion, and invasion all had their moral dimensions. Correlative thinking, which
viewed every element of existence as connected in some way to
every other, taught that harmony in the whole was determined by
moral and not physical criteria, the most central being the emperor's benevolence and officials radiating Confucian virtue. In
China, it was not, as in Europe, the rule that "fear of disaster
preceded each of the major advances in economic growth over
the centuries)and technology always came up with the answer." 41
Chinese correlative thinking and numerology, based on elaborately formulated correspondences between Yin-Yang, the Five
Elements, and domains of man and nature, persisted despite its
intellectual exhaustion and heavy criticism of its contradictions
and absurdities by scholars of the Ch'ing dynasty. 42 It was never
replaced by an alternative cosmological scheme during the imperial period because it did not serve as a framework for scientific
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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inquiry and had no serious rivals. It was a scheme for organizing
moral judgment and understanding moral relationships, not
merely a stubborn expression of Chinese inertia or ruling class
perversity and self-interest. T h e scholar Tai Chen rejected
numerological cosmology on the grounds that it was based on an
outmoded calendrical system, and the Chinese even had their
own Battle of Ancients and Moderns in early Ch'ing times, with
some participants concluding that "the science of the moderns
was necessarily superior to that of the ancients." 43 Such boldness
came to little because, with all its "modernity," the protest was
marginal in a social order governed by moral thinking referred to
historical examples and models, and to cosmic correspondences.
Much the same kind of thinking prevailed in the West into the
18th century. Western literature and thought were suffused with
ideas of a Chain of Being along which all existence was strung in
hierarchical order, of correspondences between macrocosm and
microcosm in which man summarized the universe in himself,
and of existence reflected in symbolic and allegorical metaphors.
Symbolic numerology was rampant. This way of thinking also
became too ripe, played out, and entered a deadend, provoking
criticism and satire, but the outcome was its replacement by an
alternative cosmology, that of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and
Newton. Rational criticism rather than moral exigencies carried
more weight in the West, where a "causal or genetic attitude"
came to displace the symbolist attitude. 44
Needham believes "it is precisely in the inhibition of the rise of
merchants to power in the state that we have to look for the
reasons for the inhibition of modern science and technology in
Chinese culture." 45 Mechanisms of inhibition might be sought in
the oppressiveness of bureaucratic policy in relation to merchants
by means of confiscations, heavy regulation of capital accumulation, and monopolies of salt iron, tea, wines, and foreign trade, all
of which appears in Sung times to have nipped proto-capitalism
in the bud, and continued to dog copper mining as well as salt and
iron production in the Ming-Ch'ing era—enterprises able to
stimulate applications of old and new technology. 46 Merchants
responded to constraints by investing surplus capital in extravagant living and by preparing their sons for a shot at the triennial
examinations. Initiation into the literati class was far preferable to
being rich, for the definition of status was social and not
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/6
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economic. In the 16th century one Chang Shih-i became a
tradesman to avoid poverty and to educate his sons. When one of
them succeeded in the examinations, he said: "now we can get
ourselves out of this trade business." 47 Conditions were never
consistently good for risk taking, entrepreneurship, capital accumulation, competitiveness, legal protection for investment and
property, joint stock companies, or government support for
business and technological innovation—all the kinds of things
which flourished in the West and led the European bourgeoisie
from economic to political power.
A partial explanation is that the Confucian evaluating mind saw
a flourishing merchant class, like a too powerful military establishment, as a threat to social balance and cosmic harmony. Moral
discrimination told the bureaucratic sage (no doubt self-interest
intervened as well) that it was not "right" for one class to overwhelm others, especially one that had no direct productive function and was guided by calculation and the lust for accumulation.
Perhaps the literati understood than an unfettered market economy tends to extend itself ruthlessly into every sphere of life,
substituting economic vales for all other values. T h e idea of merchants linking up with the military to bring about the kind of
commercialization of war that triumphed in Europe was even
more repugnant. After all, soldiers did not have a place in the
social hierarchy, being regarded as necessary evils. Sellers of
goods and lenders of money had no moral credentials, and hence
could not guide society as a whole or maintain harmonious relations with Heaven and Earth. Their very station in life was evidence of defective evaluating minds. Confucius, perhaps the ultimate sage, said: "A gentleman takes as much trouble to discover
what is right as lesser men take to discover what will pay." Furthermore, "gentlemen never compete," except, of course, in the
state examinations. 48 The preservation of social values required
leaders who cared more for rectitude than profit. The Marxist
temperament will, of course, see all of this as ideological rationalization of the dominant class in an agrarian mode of production, and critics of China's old regime will spotlight the corruption
in high places. On the other hand, it is not implausible that many
Confucian officials were at least as sincere and morally zealous as
17th century Calvinist entrepreneurs who believed themselves to
be members of the Elect doing God's work.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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The artisans who created and applied China's technology were
far removed from the sphere of degree-holding scholars and in
the official histories craftsmen "hardly appear at all."49 In the
voluminous body of surviving histories, monographs, encyclopedias, and local gazetteers, all of which was written "by officials
for officials," there appears to be limited space for technics and
mechanical arts, mainly having to do with hydrology, transport,
and canals, the sorts of things an official would have to be conversant with in his role as a guardian of society's agricultural foundation. 50 Amidst Chinese encyclopedias and compilations there is
nothing in scope and purpose quite like the eighteenth century
French Encyclopedie, which included volumes of exhaustively researched engravings, accompanied by descriptive articles, to illustrate, clarify, and promote technical arts. Thus Diderot himself
wrote fourteen columns on "Agriculture," and took into account
the latest discoveries of improving landlords like Jethro Tull. 51
Diderot gave as much space to mechanical arts as to philosophy,
literature, and the fine arts, and aimed to change the way all
educated people thought about the world by encouraging a spirit
of criticism and judgment based on experience. His hope was that
entire technologies could be reconstructed from the Encyclopedie
if they were ever lost in some catastrophe. His inspiration was the
Baconian vision of technology transforming and improving conditions of human life.
It is instructive to compare the content, intention, critical spirit,
and readership of Diderot's volumes with a noted work on
technology of the Ch'ing Dynasty by Sung Ying-hsing, first published in 1637, the closest approximation perhaps to a Chinese
Encyclopedie.52 Needham refers to Sung as the "Diderot of China"
and his book as "China's greatest technological classic."53 Sung
had the standard classical education and was a district education
officer when he wrote the book. We learn from Sung's Preface
that his motive, like Diderot's, was to change the way of thinking
among literati ignorant of natural phenomena and aloof from
practical crafts: "A person who is endowed with intelligence and
possesses a knowledge of the natural world is much respected by
the multitude of ordinary folk. Yet there are those who, not being
able to distinguish between jujube flowers and pear blossoms,
would prefer to indulge in speculations about the water plants of
Ch'u." 54 He was one thoughtful official concerned about re-
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medies for the ills and ineffectiveness of the late Ming (the Manchus toppled the dynasty seven years after Sung's book came out).
His book appeared about the time Chinese technology had
peaked, and its eighteen chapters touch on major industrial techniques of the time, from agriculture, textiles, mining, metallurgy,
and chemical engineering, to the building of boats and the manufacture of weapons. His main interest, however, is traditional
agricultural technique rather than metallurgy and weapons,
judging from the allotment of space to various subjects in the
same 310 page volume. Under "Casting" we find bells with a page
and a half, cooking pots with three-fourths of a page, and cannon
with only five relatively useless lines. 55 Sung's Preface is revealing
about the limitations of technological inquiry and enterprise in
seventeenth century China. He complains about a lack of funding
to acquire artifacts for close study, his inability to consult knowledgeable people for confirmation of detail because of "no meeting place for such conferences. . .," and the probable irrelevance
of his labors to the educated class, for "an ambitious scholar will
undoubtedly toss this book onto his desk and give it no further
thought: it is a work in no way concerned with the art of advancement in officialdom." 56 The educated were not interested. The
craftsmen who might have been interested could not read. The
Chinese Diderot sank into virtual oblivion after 1644 while his
European counterpart proceeded a century later to change the
general way of thinking and contribute to a revolution in thought
and politics.
The technological interests of the Encyclopedie were the culmination of a tendency among literate European craftsmen and
their admirers from the Renaissance on to discredit the bookish
mind as barren and establish the dignity and even nobility of
making useful things. The artisan's virtues were "collaboration,
progressiveness, perfecdbility, and invention," which were defended by Francis Bacon, who also viewed mechanical arts as "a
model for culture." 57 Two great ideas became associated with
mechanical arts—progress and truth. T h e first repudiated the
authority of the ancients and proclaimed the superiority of modern invention. One 16th century writer believed "the art of printing alone would easily be able to match all the inventions of the
ancients." The second idea held that a useful invention was both a
form of truth and a generator of truth. Utility and truth could not
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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be separated. Francis Bacon proclaimed "the identity of knowledge and power. . . ," 58
To the Confucian literati, all of this would have seemed subversive at worst and unintelligible at best. Craftsmen made useful
things but did not do so by exercising the evaluating mind. What
they did had social utility without moral significance. Thus it
would make no sense to say a better paddle boat is in some way
"truthful," since truth had meaning only in reference to correct
perceptions of right and wrong in social contexts. It is the case
that hydraulic engineering was especially smiled upon by Confucian bureaucrats, in large part because it was intimately connected
with the agricultural base upon which the entire social system
rested, but also because of the geographical fact that hydraulic
works cut across boundaries and automatically placed power
firmly in their hands." 59 But the truth value of hydrology was not
a common theme for celebration in treatises and histories. 60 T h e
only kind of "progress" that mattered to the individual and to
society in this frame of reference was deeper powers of benevolence, reciprocity, and propriety, and conscientiousness in all
three, attained through self-cultivation and the study of virtue in
past models. A preoccupation with ingenious machines, like a
fever for profit and material success, could eclipse the evaluating
mind, stultify moral growth, and was best kept firmly in its place.
Time and Values
T h e divergent value systems of traditional China and the West
are well manifested in the fate of mechanical clocks in the two
civilizations, a fitting example with which to conclude. T h e
mechanical clock, according to Joseph Needham, was a seminal
invention, one of the most important turning-points in the history
of science and technology." He assembled with others an exhaustive book on China's astronomical clocks, concentrating on the
huge virtuoso device completed by the official Su Sung and his
collaborators in the year 1094 A.D., and presented to the emperor
along with a treatise on the device. The clock was an observational
armillary sphere designed to mimic the motions of sun, moon,
and some stars and driven by a water wheel. Needham argues
convincingly f o r Chinese priority in d e v e l o p i n g such a
mechanism, and less so for its transmission to the West. Moreover
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/6
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there were precedents for the Su Sung adventure in astronomical
clockwork, indeed, "a long tradition of astronomical clockmaking in China between the seventh and fourteenth centuries
A.D." Needham is insistent that it is a "devastating misjudgment"
that the Chinese were indifferent to time measurement. They
divided day and night into 12 equal double hours and 100 quarters. Matteo Ricci (d. ca. 1610) and his companions, earnestly trying to convert China to the Catholic faith from the top down,
noted the use of sand, fire, water, and sunlight to mark off time
intervals, but had the impression that mechanical clocks were
unknown in the Ming court. 61 As it turned out, the Su Sung clock
was lost physically, and then in memory, along with the treatise
which contained a review of clock making in the previous six
hundred years. The enterprise was carried off on the initiative of
a few curious, gifted men with official support, but had no lasting
impact on the configuration or values of Chinese civilization. The
treatise was recovered briefly in the seventeenth century, fell
from view, surfaced again in the nineteenth century, fell from
view, and finally depended on a scholar from Cambridge University to bring it to light again. No one after Su Sung tried to duplicate his towering feat. There was no body of craftsmen ready to
improve and extend the technology as was the case with portable
time pieces in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, and no
expansive market of people eager to regulate their lives by improved time reckoning. Even the well-informed, technologically
aware Ricci and his colleagues knew nothing about it and expressed a low opinion of Chinese time keeping methods. 62
The irony is that Jesuits brought mechanical clocks with them
to China which were "instrumental in opening the gates of the
Imperial Palace at Peking . . ." It was the chimes and bells that
fascinated. 63 The emperor K'ang Hsi (1662-1722) even had a
clock workshop organized to turn out bell ringing time pieces in
quantity, which he distributed to his children and court favorites
for amusement. In short, Su Sung's epic creation had been forgotten by his own fellow mandarins, and when the mechanical
clock reappeared to the Ming and Ch'ing courts in the hands of
foreigners, it was viewed as a diverting toy, not as a practical
device to be copied, produced, and used. While Chinese may have
gestured at keeping time, they were not, like Europeans, obsessed
with time measurement. For most Chinese purposes, exact hours
and minutes were unnecessary.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
9

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 24 [1991], No. 24, Art. 6
Kenneth R. Stunkel

67

Time keeping in the West became a preoccupation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. T h e Renaissance uomo universale
(1404-1472) Leon Alberti set the tone with a "time discipline" and
"time thrift" that was to engulf Europe: "He who knows how not
to waste time can do just about anything; and he who knows how
to make use of time, he will be lord of whatever he wants." 64
European time consciousness, and the determination to divide
time lines into ever more discrete increments, added up to a passion for efficiency, control, and profit. Merchants grasped the
connection between time and money. For religious folk to waste
time was sinful. To know the time, to keep time, to be on time, to
anticipate time with precision was to be master of one's own fate
and perhaps the fate of others. Monastic clocks summoned the
faithful to prayers in the fourteenth century. T h e tower clock
summoned townsmen to work in the fifteenth. Clock time became
indispensable to commerce and industry, to transportation, and
to the military—all requiring measures of efficiency. In the sixteenth century the miniaturization of time pieces ordered the
lives of individuals rather than whole communities. T h u s
"privatization . . . of time was a major stimulus to the individualism that was an ever more salient aspect of Western Civilization." 65
The clock transformed western consciousness and became the
ultimate metaphor of cosmic order. In China, it was always a
device peripheral to both thought and society. In European experience the structure of the clock suggested a mechanical mode
of explanation, which already had its lineage in Greek astronomical systems—Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Ptolemy—whose geometric
detail permitted the construction of working models. In the sixteenth century there were celestial globes driven by clockwork
which replicated the movements of Ptolemy's universe with precision. Most striking is the prevalence of clock metaphors in western literature, something for which there is no counterpart in the
Chinese tradition. The regularity of clock motions suggested the
"harmony and orderliness" of divinity. T h e analogy of clock motions with the seasons and celestial cycles suggested God as a
clockmaker and the world as His mechanism. T h e analogy of the
world with the clock's regularities implied a world governed by
mechanical laws. The harmonious working together of numerous
parts, each fulfilling a specialized function in a larger effort, generated the idea of a system, which, in turn, suggested the effihttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/6
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ciency of parts organized around a central authority, a model of
hierarchy radically different from the chain of being, and one
vindicating a division of labor that maximized efficiency of all the
parts. Henry Ford would have recognized the principle and
smiled approvingly. 66
Which brings us back to Su Sung's "heavenly clockwork." Why
did the Chinese decline to develop and exploit such advanced
technology, which we admire at a distance of more than seven
centuries? Because everything that clocks meant to the West was
anathema to the Confucian evaluating mind, and because the
emperor, the Son of Heaven, was, in the final scheme of things,
"the master and regulator of Time." Time available to the Empire
belonged to him as did virtually everything else. He could be as
late as he wished for any occasion, and no one would complain.
Hundreds would wait for hours in the courtyard of the Forbidden City, in driving rain or blazing sun, if he chose to delay a
ceremonial. His officials could cool their heels in the ante-room
for days for all he cared, because their time did not belong to
them. If he did, he would be recognizing time as a form of private
property. Time was really important for the calendar, which is the
mian reason astronomers and mathematicians had a place in the
bureaucratic system. Imperial ceremonies, like periodic sacrifice
to Heaven and Earth at the Temple of Heaven, had the function
of holding off "the possibility of cosmic disorder." The job of the
emperor was to regulate and renew space and time. 67 He accomplished this through the power of virtue, with some help
from the calendar. Manifest virtue—produced by the Confucian
evaluating mind, symbolized in the emperor as the hinge between
Heaven a n d E a r t h , a n d objectified in a m e r i t o r i o u s
bureaucracy—was more important than exact time keeping. It
mattered far more than anything else for the ceremonies to be
executed with propriety and Tightness. It was the ideal of moral
power and not clock power that ordered the world of traditional
China.
Continuity and Change in Perspective
Chinese civilization in its last six hundred years was a more or
less steady state society whose economic, institutional, and philosophical arrangements favored a complex homeoestasis. This
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1991
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pattern of equilibrium was based on agricultural resources sustained and renewed by the photosynthesis of green plants, an
eco-technical tradition, a minimally combative relationship with
nature, a conception of human nature which stressed the primacy
of a morally evaluating mind over a rationally calculating mind,
and institutions which assured the primacy of that type of mind in
the hierarchies of political power and social position. Within such
material limits, harnessed to a status society rationalized by the
Confucian evaluating mind, the Chinese reached acknowledged
greatness in art, literature, thought, empire, and technology, and
an historical longevity rivaled only by ancient Egypt. The industrial societies of the West, committed to the pursuit of power,
wealth, and scientific knowledge, have also achieved cultural
greatness and a global influence in which western political forms
and ideas as well as technology have become nearly universal. But
the western prospect is far more uneasy and ambiguous than
China's ever was. Industrial civilization is only a century and a half
old. Undeniable prosperity and military power have been accompanied by rapid, unpredictable, destabilizing change. History's
most destructive and all-encompassing wars have been ignited by
Europeans. Mass consumer societies expecting unlimited
economic growth have squandered non-renewable resources and
undermined the global ecosystem with industrial and urban pollutants. Market economies promoting material self-interest as the
highest good, and premised on autonomous individualism as the
best measure of social meaning, have dulled the minds of millions
to any responsibility for past or future generations. T h e heritage
of the past and the unspoken needs of the future are swept aside
to satisfy the "rights" and desires of the present generation. The
"language of individualism" and "the lifestyle enclave" have
largely displaced "communities of memory" and ideal of civic
virtue. 68 Whatever the positive legacy of western culture, no form
of civilization was ever in a position to destroy so much in so brief a
time. Traditional China was never able, like the West, to foreclose
the future with nuclear war or global eco-catastrophe. Chinese
homeostasis limited destruction in war and was no threat to the
ozone or the oceans, and the meaning of individual life had a
larger context than personal success and pleasure.
Traditional Chinese civilization ran its course in the nineteenth
century, a process accelerated by violent contact with the West.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol24/iss24/6
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But the game is not yet played out. It remains to be seen if the
West will hold together as well as China did for so long a stretch of
time, bequeath a comparable legacy of wisdom and beauty to
unborn generations, and pass along a diverse and livable world in
which those generations can realize their aspirations. After all, if
longevity and survival, as well as high achievement, are tests of
civilizational success, then China's traditional arrangements and
values may have an ironic last word as industrial civilization runs
its course.
Monmouth College

NOTES
33. Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, Trans. H. M.
Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 13-19. Balazs says
outright that "it was the state that killed technological invention in
China," which might have reached "the threshold of the industrial age,"
except for "an atmosphere of routine, traditionalism, and immobility, in
which any innovation or initiative not d e m a n d e d a n d sanctioned in advance is regarded with suspicion . . ," Ibid., p. 11. Balazs tends to share
Qian's "stagnation" hypothesis without, however, sacrificing historical
perspicuousness.
34. N e e d h a m , Science in Traditional China, pp. 121-122. A useful e f f o r t
has been made to quantify China's technological development in relation
to dynastic shifts. Four categories of technology—agriculture, unifying
technology, handicraft, and medicine—are addressed. T h e category
"unifying technology," which included transportation, communication,
weaponry, calendar-making, large-scale building, and other technological modes that would "demonstrate the majesty of imperial power,"
peaked when a dynasty was strong a n d d i p p e d when it came unraveled,
and was always in the service of maintaining the integrity of a unified
feudal and bureaucratic society supported by a landlord economy. Jin
Guantao, et al., " T h e Evolution of Chinese Science and Technology," in
J. T . Fraser, et al., (eds.), The Study of Time V (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1986), pp. 172-173. Technology "transfer" across a
chaotic moment in the dynastic cycle was seriously impeded. "Whenever
a dynasty collapsed, the net increase of technological level d r o p p e d
sharply and many successful results became lost in the turmoil.. . . Inside
a closed technological system, no matter how advanced a technical invention was, it would meet immense difficulties when it came to transferring
it to other economic sectors." Ibid., p. 179. In Europe, on the other h a n d ,
technological innovation a n d its transmission were not prevented by civil
o r international wars or the rise a n d fall of states.
35. O n principles of Confucian doctrine and the hierarchy deter-
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mined by the examination system, see Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in
Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962), pp. 5-17, 24-29, and E. A. Kracke, Jr., "Region,
Family, and Individual in the Chinese Examination System," in J . K.
Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press 1957), pp. 251-253. Chu Hsi advocated the study of many
schools of thought. T h e Ming system "required candidates to prepare
themselves in the views ofjust one school, ironically the school of Chu Hsi
himself." David Nivison, "Protest Against Conventions and Conventions
of Protest," in A. Wright (ed.), The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 193. Efforts at r e f o r m got almost
nowhere.
36. Wing-tsit Chan (ed. and trans.), Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 50, 65. Ideas about
"the investigation of things" and "the extension knowledge" found in
Confucian philosophy referred to moral study and practice. Both early
Confucianism and later Neo-Confucianism, of whatever school, aimed
"to achieve the moral transformation of man and society." They were not
"utilitarian or practical in the sense of leading to modern science or
technology . . ." Chung-ying Cheng, "Practical Learning in Yen Yuan,
Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming," in Wm. T. de Bary and I. Bloom (eds.),
Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 37. Sometimes "practice" led to technology. Yen Yuan (d. 1704) ran a school (Chang Nan Shu
Yuan) in 1694 that specialized in technological subjects. It was destroyed
by flood and never rebuilt. SCC, II: 515.
37. This argument is developed in Donald Munro, The Concept of Man
in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 11-29. T h e
Confucian tradition is a complicated historical phenomenon, but with all
the transformations from Confucius and Mencius to T u n g Chung-shu to
Chu Hsi to Wang Yang-ming, the connecting, visible thread is "the
evaluating mind," which should be viewed as a Weberian "ideal type"
with heuristic value rather than as an oversimplified abstraction. Ambiguity in the ideal must be noted. Confucian ideas were not monolithic
and were commonly stretched between polarities of knowledge/action,
self-cultivation/ordering the world, and the like. See Benjamin Schwartz,
"Some Polarities in Confucian Thought," in D. Nivison and A. Wright
(eds.), Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959),
pp. 52-58. T h e ideas of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), the most eminent
Ming thinker, defend the evaluating mind by seeking "to redress the
Confucian balance in the direction of moral cultivation in practice, as
opposed to cultural activity and the accumulation of learning." Wm.
Theodore de Bary (ed.), Self and Society in Ming Thought (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 10. In Wang, "practice" means looking after society "rather than in the development of a thoroughgoing
empiricism in either the physical or social sciences." Ibid., p. 23. Behind
all the theory, Confucian moralism was balanced in historical reality by
moral failure, social horror, and preventable suffering. See Jonathan
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Spence, The Death of Woman Wang (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), p.
16-19.
38. T h e moral point of view dissuaded officials f r o m integrating mercantile interests into the fiscal m a n a g e m e n t of the state, because "it would
have been necessary to accept property rights as s u p r e m e . . .," and "that
would have r u n counter to everything the bureaucrats had learned f r o m
the Four Books." H u a n g , 1587, A Year of No Significance, p. 147.
39. Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, p. 259. Indeed, a gentleman's virtue took precedence over creative ability, and "what had not
been d o n e before should never be attempted. Not infrequently a technical innovation simply incited charges of immorality." H u a n g , 1587, A
Year of No Significance, p. 215. Qiu Renzong argues that only two kinds of
"knowledge" held sway in traditional China—knowledge of the C o n f u cian classics a n d craft knowledge. T h e latter which includes "the body of
ancient Chinese science," was controlled and put in its limited place by
the former. "Cultural and Intellectual Attitudes T h a t Prevented the
Spontaneous Emergence of Modern Science in China," The Study of Time
V, pp. 182-183.
40. Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 69.
41. Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life, p. 435. In the litany of
Confucian virtues, the notion of reciprocity (pao) in h u m a n relations
corresponded to a cosmic reciprocity between the parts of nature. See the
essay by Lien-sheng Yang in Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions, pp. 296-298.
42. Henderson points out that "most Ch'ing cosmological criticism was
focused rather narrowly on the faults of particular schemata . . . " The
Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology, p. 178. O n the range of
criticism of correlative cosmology, see Ibid., chapter 7.
43. Ibid., p. 167-168. Although China'sphilosophiaperennis was "an organic naturalism," N e e d h a m d e f e n d s a "recognition of technical progress" and "a progressive development of h u m a n knowledge in time."
Science in Traditional China, pp. 107, 112, 116, 118, 120.
44. J o h a n n Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Penguin Books,
1955), p. 204. "Finding symbols a n d allegories had become a meaningless
intellectual pastime, shallow fancifulness resting on a single analogy."
Ibid., p. 210. O n the chain of being's "widest diffusion and acceptance" in
the 18th century, see A r t h u r Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York:
H a r p e r & Borthers, 1936) pp. 183-i84. On the prevalence of correlative
thinking in Elizabethan England, see E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan
World Picture (New York: Vintage Books, n.d.), chapters 4 a n d 7.
45. N e e d h a m , The Grand Titration, p. 187. Consider the elaborate
moral and ritual efforts of the Wan-li e m p e r o r to cope with the d r o u g h t
of 1584. Ray H u a n g , 1587, A Year of No Significance; The Ming Dynasty in
Decline (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 118-120. H u a n g
sees the history of the Ming as "the tragedy of a large empire which
elected to govern itself by moral principle rather than by statutory law."
Ibid., p. 213, a n d 149.
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46. Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, pp. 10, 44-51. Huang
notes that the excellent Chinese general Ch'i Chi-kuang, "when in charge
of army training in the 1570's, found that the weaponry of his own
command was not standardized, and complained frequently of projectiles that did not fit the gun barrels, and gun barrels that tended to
explode. T h e Ming government's manufacturing enterprises were actually even more backward than their critics had imagined." Taxation of
Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, pp. 320-321. Private
industry, commerce, and associated technology for the Ming Dynasty
were marginal in government finance. Confucian economic theory required that income originate in agrarian contexts. Consequently, "the
bureaucrats could no longer stimulate and develop the more volatile
sectors of the national economy," which would have resulted in a different system of management and political philosophy, and "when an
economic activity produced social consequences that the government
could not handle, it had to be abandoned." Huang, 1587, A Year of No
Consequence, p. 144.
47. Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, p. 27. Chinese social
novels are rich in examples of such elevated status. Ibid., pp. 42-46.
48. The Analects of Confucius, trans. Arthur Waley (New York: Random
House, 1938), IV: 16, p. 105, 111:7, p. 95.
49. Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, p. 40. Cf. Needham, The
Grand Titration, p. 142. " T h e set of socio-cultural values prevailing in
Ming China actually penalized craftsmen and craftsmanship." Cipolla,
Clocks and Culture, p. 99.
50. Ibid., pp. 136-139.
51. A r t h u r Wilson,Diderot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.
74. The Encyclopedie was in part an attack on vain, empty learning and a
paean to practical knowledge of the artisan and maker of useful things.
See A Diderot Pictorial Encyclopedia of Trades and Industry, ed. Charles Gillespie. 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1959) for a glimpse at the
range of technologies in mid-18th century Europe. On the Encyclopedie,
see Will Durant's lively account in The Age of Voltaire (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1965), pp. 644-649.
52. Sung Ying-hsing, T'ien-Kung K'ai-Wu (The Creations of Nature
and Man), trans. E-Tu Zen Sun and Shiou-Chuan Sun (University Park:
T h e Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966). T h e r e were two editions
of this work before 1644. It d r o p p e d out of sight until 1914, probably
because of remarks in it regarded as subversive to the Ch'ing Dynasty by
Manchu watchdogs, although parts of the text appeared in encyclopedias
and in the Gazetteer of Yunnan Province. T h e 1914 version was a collation of a Japanese copy with some material preserved in a Chinese encyclopedia, while the two original Ming copies lay in, of all places, the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. T h e first of the Ming editions was published
in 1959, a mere 322 years after its initial appearance in 1637. See the
Translator's Preface, Ibid., pp. ix.
53. SCC, IV, 2: 171-172. T h e r e were other technological manuals as
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well. E-tu Zen Sun describes a n u m b e r of them in "Chinese History of
Technology," G. Bugliarello and D. Doner (eds.), The History and Philosophy of Technology (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 40-42.
54. T'ien-Kung K'ai-Wu, p. xiii.
55. Ibid., pp. 160-166.
56. Ibid., p. xiv.
57. Paolo Rossi, Philosophy, Technology, and the Arts in Early Modern
Europe, trans. S. Attanasio (New York: H a r p e r & Row, 1970), p. 86. It
should be said that Rossi is one of those scholars who believes the relationship between technology and the scientific revolution was intimate.
Ibid., p. 31. See also Francis Haber, "Time, Technology, a n d Productivity
Values in Early Modern Europe," in J. T . Fraser, et al. The Study of Time V,
pp. 79 ff, which explores the religious basis of values in the Christian
West which justified improvements in manufacturing, technology, and
economic productivity.
58. Ibid., pp. 75, 151.
59. N e e d h a m , Science in Traditional China, pp. 24-25.
60. T h e r e are exceptions. For example, the square-pallet chain p u m p ,
a device for raising water, was extolled f r o m time to time in Chinese
literature. SCC, vol. 4, pt. 2: 346-347.
61. J o s e p h N e e d h a m , et al., Heavenly Clockwork: The Great Astronomical
Clocks of Medieval China 2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), pp. 1-2, 168 n, 154-155. Needham's claims about the influence of the clock on Europe are discussed by David Landis, Revolution in
Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 17-25. See Needham's elaborate flow
chart tracing the international development of mechanical clockwork in
SCC, IV, 2: 53. In Su Sung's historical introduction to his account of how
the clock was made, "six centuries of Chinese horological engineering,
previously hidden, came to light." Needham, Clerks and Craftsmen, p. 211.
A western commitment to linear time ought stands in contrast to a
Chinese taste f o r "nesting time cycles" with "formal correspondences."
Kristopher Schipper and Wang Hsiu-huei, "Progressive and Regressive
T i m e Cycles in Taoist Ritual," J. T. Fraser, et al., (eds.), The Study of Time
V, p. 185.
62. Ricci said "all such instruments are very inaccurate." Quoted in
Cipolla, Clocks and Culture, p. 80. In fairness, there were Chinese officials
who held the same view of western clocks a n d thought them extravagant
to boot. Landis, Revolution in Time, pp. 47-48. On the fate of the Su Sung
clock, see Ibid., pp. 33-35.
63. Cipolla, Clocks and Culture, pp. 82-89.
64. Landes, Revolution in time, p. 92.
65. Ibid., p. 89.
66. Otto Mayr, Authority, Liberty, & Automatic Machinery in Early Modern
Europe (Baltimore: T h e J o h n s Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 115119. See also Francis Haber, " T h e Cathedral Clock and the Cosmological
Clock Metaphor," in J. T . Fraser a n d N. Lawrence (eds.) The Study of Time
II (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1975), pp. 339 ff.
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67. Jacques Gernet, Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion,
1250-1276, Trans: H. M. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1962), p. 197. As Landis puts it: "His time was China's time." Revolution in
Time, p. 33.
68. Robert Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), pp. 281-296.
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